Suchergebnisse

International audience ; Although officially introduced in Communist Party of China (CPC) doctrine in 2012, the concept of public diplomacy (PD) in China has taken various forms: people's diplomacy (renmin waijiao), civil diplomacy (minjian waijiao), and external propaganda (duiwai xuanchuan). In these quasi-PD activities, Beijing has regarded the principle of relationship management as an important means to deal with uncertainty in international communication. Relationship management has largely been a strategic response to international criticism since the Mao era. When China and India codified the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence for trade and intercourse between Tibet and India in 1954, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai implicitly conceptualised the ideas of "doing business" and "making friends." International criticism and negative feedback about neo-colonialist trends in Africa from the beginning of the 21st century have prompted China to use a public-centric approach to African PD in order to enhance its international legitimacy while managing uncertainty. The Confucius Institute (CI) is currently a flagship brand of China's statecraft in Africa through which Beijing advances its reputation among local publics. The Chinese government uses relationship management, relationship synergies, and interpersonal communication, within the framework of CI, to display China's charm and to legitimise its geopolitical presence and its industrial and commercial implantations in Africa.

International audience ; Although officially introduced in Communist Party of China (CPC) doctrine in 2012, the concept of public diplomacy (PD) in China has taken various forms: people's diplomacy (renmin waijiao), civil diplomacy (minjian waijiao), and external propaganda (duiwai xuanchuan). In these quasi-PD activities, Beijing has regarded the principle of relationship management as an important means to deal with uncertainty in international communication. Relationship management has largely been a strategic response to international criticism since the Mao era. When China and India codified the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence for trade and intercourse between Tibet and India in 1954, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai implicitly conceptualised the ideas of "doing business" and "making friends." International criticism and negative feedback about neo-colonialist trends in Africa from the beginning of the 21st century have prompted China to use a public-centric approach to African PD in order to enhance its international legitimacy while managing uncertainty. The Confucius Institute (CI) is currently a flagship brand of China's statecraft in Africa through which Beijing advances its reputation among local publics. The Chinese government uses relationship management, relationship synergies, and interpersonal communication, within the framework of CI, to display China's charm and to legitimise its geopolitical presence and its industrial and commercial implantations in Africa.

International audience ; Although officially introduced in Communist Party of China (CPC) doctrine in 2012, the concept of public diplomacy (PD) in China has taken various forms: people's diplomacy (renmin waijiao), civil diplomacy (minjian waijiao), and external propaganda (duiwai xuanchuan). In these quasi-PD activities, Beijing has regarded the principle of relationship management as an important means to deal with uncertainty in international communication. Relationship management has largely been a strategic response to international criticism since the Mao era. When China and India codified the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence for trade and intercourse between Tibet and India in 1954, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai implicitly conceptualised the ideas of "doing business" and "making friends." International criticism and negative feedback about neo-colonialist trends in Africa from the beginning of the 21st century have prompted China to use a public-centric approach to African PD in order to enhance its international legitimacy while managing uncertainty. The Confucius Institute (CI) is currently a flagship brand of China's statecraft in Africa through which Beijing advances its reputation among local publics. The Chinese government uses relationship management, relationship synergies, and interpersonal communication, within the framework of CI, to display China's charm and to legitimise its geopolitical presence and its industrial and commercial implantations in Africa.

International audience Public diplomacy is known as the "sunrise" of emerging interdisciplinary research. It provides an arousing widespread interest in academia. The marginal nature of the discipline seems to have made public diplomacy a large-sense concept. As an academic term that emerged in the United States, public diplomacy has its pedigree regarding theorization, conceptualization, and institutionalization. This article reflects on public diplomacy's conceptualization process and its different stages from etymology and ontology. It aims to discuss public diplomacy's theoretical basis and ontological paradigms in different historical periods of international political evolution.

International audience ; Although officially introduced in Communist Party of China (CPC) doctrine in 2012, the concept of public diplomacy (PD) in China has taken various forms: people's diplomacy (renmin waijiao), civil diplomacy (minjian waijiao), and external propaganda (duiwai xuanchuan). In these quasi-PD activities, Beijing has regarded the principle of relationship management as an important means to deal with uncertainty in international communication. Relationship management has largely been a strategic response to international criticism since the Mao era. When China and India codified the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence for trade and intercourse between Tibet and India in 1954, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai implicitly conceptualised the ideas of "doing business" and "making friends." International criticism and negative feedback about neo-colonialist trends in Africa from the beginning of the 21st century have prompted China to use a public-centric approach to African PD in order to enhance its international legitimacy while managing uncertainty. The Confucius Institute (CI) is currently a flagship brand of China's statecraft in Africa through which Beijing advances its reputation among local publics. The Chinese government uses relationship management, relationship synergies, and interpersonal communication, within the framework of CI, to display China's charm and to legitimise its geopolitical presence and its industrial and commercial implantations in Africa.

The age-old link and "socialist friendships" between China and various African states have enjoyed a privileged position in Beijing's foreign policy since the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. As a "proving ground" of China's soft power and an exceptional place to project the "Chinese Dream", Africa has become a valuable target of Beijing's socialist development model. China weaves relationships with African populations through intense public diplomacy. Such practice revolves around its promise to sustain economic growth and to improve the daily lives of people in Africa. The Confucius Institute is currently a flagship brand of China's statecraft in Africa through which Beijing advances its reputation among local publics. Beyond its pedagogical and cultural missions, the Confucius Institute is an effective but subtle spokesperson for Beijing. Within its local branches, trained employees actively participate in a long-term strategy of influence based on affective engagement. They engage local students in numerous group activities and build strong bonds with them. Their voices are individual, but their homogenous discourse resonate with "China's voice" to deliver formulated Communist Party of China's propaganda to foreign publics. In doing so, these teachers wield China's soft power. The aim of this Ph.D. dissertation is to examine public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, its conceptualization, institutionalization, and practices. From a communication perspective, this study is an exploration of the hybrid and complex nature of China's public diplomacy, which Beijing has strategically organized to deploy its soft power in Africa.Ethnographic observation in Nairobi, Beijing, and Shanghai shed light on the strategic communication practices associated with the Confucius Institute. By mobilizing institutional discourse and media discourse studies and conducting semi-structured interviews, I investigated the daily educational and cultural activities conducted by Confucius Institute employees for African students. This investigation captured the intra- and inter-organizational relationships among a local Confucius Institute in Nairobi, its Headquarters (also named Hanban) in Beijing, and its various Chinese and foreign partners.The Confucius Institute in Nairobi is at the heart of several networks involved in implementing Chinese public diplomacy, working to improve Kenyans' perception of China, and legitimizing Beijing's foreign policy and economic presence. First, within a strategic interpersonal relationship management network, the Confucius Institute's employees use various cultural, artistic and social practices and narratives to engage students (micro-level). Second, cooperative and interdependent relationships between actors within and around the Confucius Institute facilitate the implementation of the public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics (meso-level). Finally, China's domestic and foreign policy and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation enable the Chinese Party-State to implement a legitimization strategy based on the weaving of an "institutional network". This network allows the Confucius Institute, in subtle and soft ways, to defend Beijing's economic interests in Africa and to disseminate its political model (macro-level). ; Le lien millénaire qui relie la Chine-Afrique jouit d'une position privilégiée dans la diplomatie chinoise depuis la proclamation de la République populaire de Chine en 1949. Le continent africain est considéré à la fois comme un terrain d'expérimentation, mais également comme un lieu privilégié pour mettre en scène le « rêve chinois » d'exportation d'un modèle socialiste de développement. De fait, la Chine tisse des relations avec les peuples africains grâce à une intense diplomatie publique.Cette diplomatie publique s'articule autour de la promesse du Parti-État chinois d'une croissance économique africaine durable et d'une amélioration de la vie quotidienne. Au-delà de ses missions pédagogiques et de valorisation culturelle, l'Institut Confucius joue avec autant d'efficacité que de subtilité le rôle de porte-parole de cette double promesse. Au sein des antennes locales de l'Institut Confucius, les employés sont choisis et formés pour participer activement à une stratégie d'influence à long terme basée sur les affects. Ils engagent les étudiants dans de nombreuses activités collectives, et tissent avec eux des liens forts d'attachement. Leurs voix sont individuelles, mais leurs discours homogènes entrent en résonnance chinoises pour faire entendre aux publics étrangers un discours de propagande formulé par le Parti communiste chinois. Ce faisant, ces enseignants participent au déploiement du soft power chinois. Cette thèse étudie la diplomatie publique à la chinoise, sa conceptualisation, son institutionnalisation et ses pratiques. Dans une perspective communicationnelle, elle explore la dimension hybride et complexe des actions organisées de diplomatie publique à la chinoise pour décrire et comprendre comment Pékin déploie de manière stratégique son soft power à l'égard des publics africains.La méthodologie pluraliste associe des observations ethnographiques organisationnelles à Nairobi, Pékin et Shanghai, qui ont permis de comprendre l'ensemble des activités de communication stratégique déployées par et autour de l'Institut Confucius. Grâce à une étude de discours institutionnels, des études des discours médiatiques et des entretiens semi-directifs, la thèse analyse les activités pédagogiques et culturelles organisées au quotidien par les employés de l'Institut Confucius pour les étudiants africains. Elle saisit conjointement les relations intra- et inter-organisationnelles entre un Institut Confucius local, sa direction au niveau du Siège de l'Institut Confucius (Hanban) et ses divers partenaires chinois et étrangers.L'Institut Confucius de Nairobi est au cœur de plusieurs réseaux qui participent à la mise en œuvre de la diplomatie publique chinoise, qui œuvrent donc pour améliorer la perception de la Chine par les Kényans, pour légitimer sa politique étrangère et sa présence économique. Au niveau micro, la thèse met en évidence la gestion stratégique par l'Institut Confucius des relations interpersonnelles entre étudiants et enseignants, ainsi que des pratiques culturelles et artistiques et des récits. Au niveau méso, des relations de coopération et d'interdépendance entre acteurs gravitant au sein et autour de l'Institut Confucius facilitent la mise en œuvre de la diplomatie publique chinoise. Au niveau macro, la politique intérieure et étrangère de la Chine ainsi que le Forum sur la coopération sino-africaine permettent au Parti-État chinois de mettre en œuvre une stratégie de légitimation basée sur le tissage d'un « réseau institutionnel ». Grâce à ce réseau, l'Institut Confucius plaide de manière très subtile et douce en faveur de la défense des intérêts économiques de Pékin en Afrique et de la diffusion de son modèle politique.

The age-old link and "socialist friendships" between China and various African states have enjoyed a privileged position in Beijing's foreign policy since the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. As a "proving ground" of China's soft power and an exceptional place to project the "Chinese Dream", Africa has become a valuable target of Beijing's socialist development model. China weaves relationships with African populations through intense public diplomacy. Such practice revolves around its promise to sustain economic growth and to improve the daily lives of people in Africa. The Confucius Institute is currently a flagship brand of China's statecraft in Africa through which Beijing advances its reputation among local publics. Beyond its pedagogical and cultural missions, the Confucius Institute is an effective but subtle spokesperson for Beijing. Within its local branches, trained employees actively participate in a long-term strategy of influence based on affective engagement. They engage local students in numerous group activities and build strong bonds with them. Their voices are individual, but their homogenous discourse resonate with "China's voice" to deliver formulated Communist Party of China's propaganda to foreign publics. In doing so, these teachers wield China's soft power. The aim of this Ph.D. dissertation is to examine public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, its conceptualization, institutionalization, and practices. From a communication perspective, this study is an exploration of the hybrid and complex nature of China's public diplomacy, which Beijing has strategically organized to deploy its soft power in Africa.Ethnographic observation in Nairobi, Beijing, and Shanghai shed light on the strategic communication practices associated with the Confucius Institute. By mobilizing institutional discourse and media discourse studies and conducting semi-structured interviews, I investigated the daily educational and cultural activities conducted by Confucius Institute employees for African students. This investigation captured the intra- and inter-organizational relationships among a local Confucius Institute in Nairobi, its Headquarters (also named Hanban) in Beijing, and its various Chinese and foreign partners. The Confucius Institute in Nairobi is at the heart of several networks involved in implementing Chinese public diplomacy, working to improve Kenyans' perception of China, and legitimizing Beijing's foreign policy and economic presence. First, within a strategic interpersonal relationship management network, the Confucius Institute's employees use various cultural, artistic and social practices and narratives to engage students (micro-level). Second, cooperative and interdependent relationships between actors within and around the Confucius Institute facilitate the implementation of the public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics (meso-level). Finally, China's domestic and foreign policy and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation enable the Chinese Party-State to implement a legitimization strategy based on the weaving of an "institutional network". This network allows the Confucius Institute, in subtle and soft ways, to defend Beijing's economic interests in Africa and to disseminate its political model (macro-level) ; Le lien millénaire qui relie la Chine-Afrique jouit d'une position privilégiée dans la diplomatie chinoise depuis la proclamation de la République populaire de Chine en 1949. Le continent africain est considéré à la fois comme un terrain d'expérimentation, mais également comme un lieu privilégié pour mettre en scène le « rêve chinois » d'exportation d'un modèle socialiste de développement. De fait, la Chine tisse des relations avec les peuples africains grâce à une intense diplomatie publique.Cette diplomatie publique s'articule autour de la promesse du Parti-État chinois d'une croissance économique africaine durable et d'une amélioration de la vie quotidienne. Au-delà de ses missions pédagogiques et de valorisation culturelle, l'Institut Confucius joue avec autant d'efficacité que de subtilité le rôle de porte-parole de cette double promesse. Au sein des antennes locales de l'Institut Confucius, les employés sont choisis et formés pour participer activement à une stratégie d'influence à long terme basée sur les affects. Ils engagent les étudiants dans de nombreuses activités collectives, et tissent avec eux des liens forts d'attachement. Leurs voix sont individuelles, mais leurs discours homogènes entrent en résonnance chinoises pour faire entendre aux publics étrangers un discours de propagande formulé par le Parti communiste chinois. Ce faisant, ces enseignants participent au déploiement du soft power chinois. Cette thèse étudie la diplomatie publique à la chinoise, sa conceptualisation, son institutionnalisation et ses pratiques. Dans une perspective communicationnelle, elle explore la dimension hybride et complexe des actions organisées de diplomatie publique à la chinoise pour décrire et comprendre comment Pékin déploie de manière stratégique son soft power à l'égard des publics africains. La méthodologie pluraliste associe des observations ethnographiques organisationnelles à Nairobi, Pékin et Shanghai, qui ont permis de comprendre l'ensemble des activités de communication stratégique déployées par et autour de l'Institut Confucius. Grâce à une étude de discours institutionnels, des études des discours médiatiques et des entretiens semi-directifs, la thèse analyse les activités pédagogiques et culturelles organisées au quotidien par les employés de l'Institut Confucius pour les étudiants africains. Elle saisit conjointement les relations intra- et inter-organisationnelles entre un Institut Confucius local, sa direction au niveau du Siège de l'Institut Confucius (Hanban) et ses divers partenaires chinois et étrangers. L'Institut Confucius de Nairobi est au cœur de plusieurs réseaux qui participent à la mise en œuvre de la diplomatie publique chinoise, qui œuvrent donc pour améliorer la perception de la Chine par les Kényans, pour légitimer sa politique étrangère et sa présence économique. Au niveau micro, la thèse met en évidence la gestion stratégique par l'Institut Confucius des relations interpersonnelles entre étudiants et enseignants, ainsi que des pratiques culturelles et artistiques et des récits. Au niveau méso, des relations de coopération et d'interdépendance entre acteurs gravitant au sein et autour de l'Institut Confucius facilitent la mise en œuvre de la diplomatie publique chinoise. Au niveau macro, la politique intérieure et étrangère de la Chine ainsi que le Forum sur la coopération sino-africaine permettent au Parti-État chinois de mettre en œuvre une stratégie de légitimation basée sur le tissage d'un « réseau institutionnel ». Grâce à ce réseau, l'Institut Confucius plaide de manière très subtile et douce en faveur de la défense des intérêts économiques de Pékin en Afrique et de la diffusion de son modèle politique

The age-old link and "socialist friendships" between China and various African states have enjoyed a privileged position in Beijing's foreign policy since the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. As a "proving ground" of China's soft power and an exceptional place to project the "Chinese Dream", Africa has become a valuable target of Beijing's socialist development model. China weaves relationships with African populations through intense public diplomacy. Such practice revolves around its promise to sustain economic growth and to improve the daily lives of people in Africa. The Confucius Institute is currently a flagship brand of China's statecraft in Africa through which Beijing advances its reputation among local publics. Beyond its pedagogical and cultural missions, the Confucius Institute is an effective but subtle spokesperson for Beijing. Within its local branches, trained employees actively participate in a long-term strategy of influence based on affective engagement. They engage local students in numerous group activities and build strong bonds with them. Their voices are individual, but their homogenous discourse resonate with "China's voice" to deliver formulated Communist Party of China's propaganda to foreign publics. In doing so, these teachers wield China's soft power. The aim of this Ph.D. dissertation is to examine public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, its conceptualization, institutionalization, and practices. From a communication perspective, this study is an exploration of the hybrid and complex nature of China's public diplomacy, which Beijing has strategically organized to deploy its soft power in Africa.Ethnographic observation in Nairobi, Beijing, and Shanghai shed light on the strategic communication practices associated with the Confucius Institute. By mobilizing institutional discourse and media discourse studies and conducting semi-structured interviews, I investigated the daily educational and cultural activities conducted by Confucius Institute employees for African students. This investigation captured the intra- and inter-organizational relationships among a local Confucius Institute in Nairobi, its Headquarters (also named Hanban) in Beijing, and its various Chinese and foreign partners. The Confucius Institute in Nairobi is at the heart of several networks involved in implementing Chinese public diplomacy, working to improve Kenyans' perception of China, and legitimizing Beijing's foreign policy and economic presence. First, within a strategic interpersonal relationship management network, the Confucius Institute's employees use various cultural, artistic and social practices and narratives to engage students (micro-level). Second, cooperative and interdependent relationships between actors within and around the Confucius Institute facilitate the implementation of the public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics (meso-level). Finally, China's domestic and foreign policy and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation enable the Chinese Party-State to implement a legitimization strategy based on the weaving of an "institutional network". This network allows the Confucius Institute, in subtle and soft ways, to defend Beijing's economic interests in Africa and to disseminate its political model (macro-level) ; Le lien millénaire qui relie la Chine-Afrique jouit d'une position privilégiée dans la diplomatie chinoise depuis la proclamation de la République populaire de Chine en 1949. Le continent africain est considéré à la fois comme un terrain d'expérimentation, mais également comme un lieu privilégié pour mettre en scène le « rêve chinois » d'exportation d'un modèle socialiste de développement. De fait, la Chine tisse des relations avec les peuples africains grâce à une intense diplomatie publique.Cette diplomatie publique s'articule autour de la promesse du Parti-État chinois d'une croissance économique africaine durable et d'une amélioration de la vie quotidienne. Au-delà de ses missions pédagogiques et de valorisation culturelle, l'Institut Confucius joue avec autant d'efficacité que de subtilité le rôle de porte-parole de cette double promesse. Au sein des antennes locales de l'Institut Confucius, les employés sont choisis et formés pour participer activement à une stratégie d'influence à long terme basée sur les affects. Ils engagent les étudiants dans de nombreuses activités collectives, et tissent avec eux des liens forts d'attachement. Leurs voix sont individuelles, mais leurs discours homogènes entrent en résonnance chinoises pour faire entendre aux publics étrangers un discours de propagande formulé par le Parti communiste chinois. Ce faisant, ces enseignants participent au déploiement du soft power chinois. Cette thèse étudie la diplomatie publique à la chinoise, sa conceptualisation, son institutionnalisation et ses pratiques. Dans une perspective communicationnelle, elle explore la dimension hybride et complexe des actions organisées de diplomatie publique à la chinoise pour décrire et comprendre comment Pékin déploie de manière stratégique son soft power à l'égard des publics africains. La méthodologie pluraliste associe des observations ethnographiques organisationnelles à Nairobi, Pékin et Shanghai, qui ont permis de comprendre l'ensemble des activités de communication stratégique déployées par et autour de l'Institut Confucius. Grâce à une étude de discours institutionnels, des études des discours médiatiques et des entretiens semi-directifs, la thèse analyse les activités pédagogiques et culturelles organisées au quotidien par les employés de l'Institut Confucius pour les étudiants africains. Elle saisit conjointement les relations intra- et inter-organisationnelles entre un Institut Confucius local, sa direction au niveau du Siège de l'Institut Confucius (Hanban) et ses divers partenaires chinois et étrangers. L'Institut Confucius de Nairobi est au cœur de plusieurs réseaux qui participent à la mise en œuvre de la diplomatie publique chinoise, qui œuvrent donc pour améliorer la perception de la Chine par les Kényans, pour légitimer sa politique étrangère et sa présence économique. Au niveau micro, la thèse met en évidence la gestion stratégique par l'Institut Confucius des relations interpersonnelles entre étudiants et enseignants, ainsi que des pratiques culturelles et artistiques et des récits. Au niveau méso, des relations de coopération et d'interdépendance entre acteurs gravitant au sein et autour de l'Institut Confucius facilitent la mise en œuvre de la diplomatie publique chinoise. Au niveau macro, la politique intérieure et étrangère de la Chine ainsi que le Forum sur la coopération sino-africaine permettent au Parti-État chinois de mettre en œuvre une stratégie de légitimation basée sur le tissage d'un « réseau institutionnel ». Grâce à ce réseau, l'Institut Confucius plaide de manière très subtile et douce en faveur de la défense des intérêts économiques de Pékin en Afrique et de la diffusion de son modèle politique

The age-old link and "socialist friendships" between China and various African states have enjoyed a privileged position in Beijing's foreign policy since the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. As a "proving ground" of China's soft power and an exceptional place to project the "Chinese Dream", Africa has become a valuable target of Beijing's socialist development model. China weaves relationships with African populations through intense public diplomacy. Such practice revolves around its promise to sustain economic growth and to improve the daily lives of people in Africa. The Confucius Institute is currently a flagship brand of China's statecraft in Africa through which Beijing advances its reputation among local publics. Beyond its pedagogical and cultural missions, the Confucius Institute is an effective but subtle spokesperson for Beijing. Within its local branches, trained employees actively participate in a long-term strategy of influence based on affective engagement. They engage local students in numerous group activities and build strong bonds with them. Their voices are individual, but their homogenous discourse resonate with "China's voice" to deliver formulated Communist Party of China's propaganda to foreign publics. In doing so, these teachers wield China's soft power. The aim of this Ph.D. dissertation is to examine public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, its conceptualization, institutionalization, and practices. From a communication perspective, this study is an exploration of the hybrid and complex nature of China's public diplomacy, which Beijing has strategically organized to deploy its soft power in Africa.Ethnographic observation in Nairobi, Beijing, and Shanghai shed light on the strategic communication practices associated with the Confucius Institute. By mobilizing institutional discourse and media discourse studies and conducting semi-structured interviews, I investigated the daily educational and cultural activities conducted by Confucius Institute employees for African students. This investigation captured the intra- and inter-organizational relationships among a local Confucius Institute in Nairobi, its Headquarters (also named Hanban) in Beijing, and its various Chinese and foreign partners.The Confucius Institute in Nairobi is at the heart of several networks involved in implementing Chinese public diplomacy, working to improve Kenyans' perception of China, and legitimizing Beijing's foreign policy and economic presence. First, within a strategic interpersonal relationship management network, the Confucius Institute's employees use various cultural, artistic and social practices and narratives to engage students (micro-level). Second, cooperative and interdependent relationships between actors within and around the Confucius Institute facilitate the implementation of the public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics (meso-level). Finally, China's domestic and foreign policy and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation enable the Chinese Party-State to implement a legitimization strategy based on the weaving of an "institutional network". This network allows the Confucius Institute, in subtle and soft ways, to defend Beijing's economic interests in Africa and to disseminate its political model (macro-level). ; Le lien millénaire qui relie la Chine-Afrique jouit d'une position privilégiée dans la diplomatie chinoise depuis la proclamation de la République populaire de Chine en 1949. Le continent africain est considéré à la fois comme un terrain d'expérimentation, mais également comme un lieu privilégié pour mettre en scène le « rêve chinois » d'exportation d'un modèle socialiste de développement. De fait, la Chine tisse des relations avec les peuples africains grâce à une intense diplomatie publique.Cette diplomatie publique s'articule autour de la promesse du Parti-État chinois d'une croissance économique africaine durable et d'une amélioration de la vie quotidienne. Au-delà de ses missions pédagogiques et de valorisation culturelle, l'Institut Confucius joue avec autant d'efficacité que de subtilité le rôle de porte-parole de cette double promesse. Au sein des antennes locales de l'Institut Confucius, les employés sont choisis et formés pour participer activement à une stratégie d'influence à long terme basée sur les affects. Ils engagent les étudiants dans de nombreuses activités collectives, et tissent avec eux des liens forts d'attachement. Leurs voix sont individuelles, mais leurs discours homogènes entrent en résonnance chinoises pour faire entendre aux publics étrangers un discours de propagande formulé par le Parti communiste chinois. Ce faisant, ces enseignants participent au déploiement du soft power chinois. Cette thèse étudie la diplomatie publique à la chinoise, sa conceptualisation, son institutionnalisation et ses pratiques. Dans une perspective communicationnelle, elle explore la dimension hybride et complexe des actions organisées de diplomatie publique à la chinoise pour décrire et comprendre comment Pékin déploie de manière stratégique son soft power à l'égard des publics africains.La méthodologie pluraliste associe des observations ethnographiques organisationnelles à Nairobi, Pékin et Shanghai, qui ont permis de comprendre l'ensemble des activités de communication stratégique déployées par et autour de l'Institut Confucius. Grâce à une étude de discours institutionnels, des études des discours médiatiques et des entretiens semi-directifs, la thèse analyse les activités pédagogiques et culturelles organisées au quotidien par les employés de l'Institut Confucius pour les étudiants africains. Elle saisit conjointement les relations intra- et inter-organisationnelles entre un Institut Confucius local, sa direction au niveau du Siège de l'Institut Confucius (Hanban) et ses divers partenaires chinois et étrangers.L'Institut Confucius de Nairobi est au cœur de plusieurs réseaux qui participent à la mise en œuvre de la diplomatie publique chinoise, qui œuvrent donc pour améliorer la perception de la Chine par les Kényans, pour légitimer sa politique étrangère et sa présence économique. Au niveau micro, la thèse met en évidence la gestion stratégique par l'Institut Confucius des relations interpersonnelles entre étudiants et enseignants, ainsi que des pratiques culturelles et artistiques et des récits. Au niveau méso, des relations de coopération et d'interdépendance entre acteurs gravitant au sein et autour de l'Institut Confucius facilitent la mise en œuvre de la diplomatie publique chinoise. Au niveau macro, la politique intérieure et étrangère de la Chine ainsi que le Forum sur la coopération sino-africaine permettent au Parti-État chinois de mettre en œuvre une stratégie de légitimation basée sur le tissage d'un « réseau institutionnel ». Grâce à ce réseau, l'Institut Confucius plaide de manière très subtile et douce en faveur de la défense des intérêts économiques de Pékin en Afrique et de la diffusion de son modèle politique.

International audience ; This thesis focuses on China's hybrid lobbying strategies (economic and cultural, hard and soft power) in the sectors of media and telecommunication in Africa, particularly in Kenya and South Africa. It intends to analyse changing Chinese soft power influence strategies in the digital and social media age. I rely on different perspectives and theoretical approaches: public policies cognitive analysis, media framing effects on political debates, critical analysis of the uses of information and communication tools in different socio- historical backgrounds, prospective analysis of PR techniques evolution (Davidson, 2016; Olsson & Eriksson, 2016; Yeomans, 2016; Kantola, 2016; Bernays, 2013; Berg, 2009). We mean to examine the innovative way in which the Chinese "party-state" spreads a certain vision of its culture and ideology on the African continent in order to promote its economic interest. This grass-roots lobbying (Barnes & Balnave, 2015; Schneider, 2015; Jalali, 2013; Reddick & Norris, 2013) can be described accurately with the metaphor of the Trojan horse.As the essential destination of the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road", the official ways to name Chinese international relations' strategy, Kenya has become a hub for China. China's cultural institutions opened their first African Confucius Institute there. Being one of the members of BRICS, South Africa also grew into the business centre of China in Africa. Many important branches of Chinese Telecom companies are based in the country. It seems that these institutions, no matter public or private, were eventually being an essential channel for China's local PR actions.As the core channels of "soft power", culture and knowledge encapsulate values, ideologies and beliefs (Desmoulins & Huang, 2017; Gupta, 2013; Martel, 2013; DeLisle, 2010; Courmont, 2009; Bläser, 2005; Keohane, Jr, & Keohane, 1998; Nye, 2006, 2004, 1991). China's cultural associations, training institutes, humanitarian foundations, companies as well as government's propaganda are mutually reinforced and seem to be aimed to enhance China's cultural, political and economic influence spheres indifferently.This could not be possible without a high level of centralisation and of governmental control, pervasive media propaganda and well-funded and staffed information censorship institutions. As a matter of fact, China remains a one-party state, its constitution determines the Communist Party of China (CCP) as China's sole ruling party, although Chinese economic development after the reform and opening up of 1978 shows the characteristics of capitalism. Most Chinese companies are owned by the state. Furthermore, even through Chinese Constitution protects the freedom of speech and of the press (see Chapter 2, Article 35), the status of Chinese press is extraordinary and difficult to tackle from a western viewpoint. In China, media plays as the spokesman filtering all negative news and led by the CPC, which means it defends politically governmental issues and positions, even participates in all political propaganda.One hypothesis is that since China is the birthplace of the Confucian culture and since Chinese people see themselves as the continuator of Confucianism, interests' groups PR strategies rely on different action lever than in Western Europe. Common interests are more valued than individual interests, political authority is more important than individual freedoms, also social responsibility wins over individual rights (Chu, 2016, p. 198; Huntington, 1997, p. 10). Functioning as the vanguard of Chinese image's promotion, all people are considered as the spokesman of the CPC, no matter whether they are working for a media company, a cultural public agency or the diplomatic corps. They carry out a gatekeeping process (Brown, 1979, p. 595; Lewin, 1997) to promote CPC ideas and to promote the development in Africa of a kind of socialism that presents Chinese genuine characteristics.The thesis examines the current logic of China's and China's companies' soft power strategies, and the related PR actions. The main research question is: what is so special with the Chinese soft power strategies (one-party system, censorship, propaganda, state monopolies, centralisation of the decision-making process, economic boost, ecological crisis, millennium Confucian philosophy and appealing non-individualistic culture in a context of capitalist crisis)? How are China's governmental diplomacy and corporate PR strategies conceived, deployed and intertwined? How do second-track diplomacy and PR strategies differ and interact? I chose to adopt a comparative approach (two countries and two sectors of activity). How do these strategies interact with other resources of power in the digital and social media age?A multidimensional theoretical framework was mobilized, I aim to associate different approaches of public relations, lobbying, communication, international relations and foreign policy (political science, political theory). Secondly, fieldworks in Kenya and South Africa will take place in Spring 2018 to interview local residents, such as African branches of Chinese enterprises and media (China Telecom, Huawei, StarTimes, CGTN, CCTV, Xinhua), as well as representatives of Confucius Institutes and China's local embassies. I will also analyse the rhetoric and semiotic of Chinese soft power strategies as it reveals itself on sites, forums, blogs and social media platforms, where PR strategies of China's companies and governmental agencies are revealed.In short, I intend to analyse the institutional, rhetorical and technical innovative strategies deployed by China, its second-rack diplomacy, its soft power strategy (local PR actions and digital grass-roots lobbying). My study encompasses the PR actions of Chinese companies and governmental agencies in Africa by focusing on two sectors (telecoms, media), and two main countries: Kenya and South Africa.

International audience ; This thesis focuses on China's hybrid lobbying strategies (economic and cultural, hard and soft power) in the sectors of media and telecommunication in Africa, particularly in Kenya and South Africa. It intends to analyse changing Chinese soft power influence strategies in the digital and social media age. I rely on different perspectives and theoretical approaches: public policies cognitive analysis, media framing effects on political debates, critical analysis of the uses of information and communication tools in different socio- historical backgrounds, prospective analysis of PR techniques evolution (Davidson, 2016; Olsson & Eriksson, 2016; Yeomans, 2016; Kantola, 2016; Bernays, 2013; Berg, 2009). We mean to examine the innovative way in which the Chinese "party-state" spreads a certain vision of its culture and ideology on the African continent in order to promote its economic interest. This grass-roots lobbying (Barnes & Balnave, 2015; Schneider, 2015; Jalali, 2013; Reddick & Norris, 2013) can be described accurately with the metaphor of the Trojan horse.As the essential destination of the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road", the official ways to name Chinese international relations' strategy, Kenya has become a hub for China. China's cultural institutions opened their first African Confucius Institute there. Being one of the members of BRICS, South Africa also grew into the business centre of China in Africa. Many important branches of Chinese Telecom companies are based in the country. It seems that these institutions, no matter public or private, were eventually being an essential channel for China's local PR actions.As the core channels of "soft power", culture and knowledge encapsulate values, ideologies and beliefs (Desmoulins & Huang, 2017; Gupta, 2013; Martel, 2013; DeLisle, 2010; Courmont, 2009; Bläser, 2005; Keohane, Jr, & Keohane, 1998; Nye, 2006, 2004, 1991). China's cultural associations, training institutes, humanitarian foundations, companies as well as government's propaganda are mutually reinforced and seem to be aimed to enhance China's cultural, political and economic influence spheres indifferently.This could not be possible without a high level of centralisation and of governmental control, pervasive media propaganda and well-funded and staffed information censorship institutions. As a matter of fact, China remains a one-party state, its constitution determines the Communist Party of China (CCP) as China's sole ruling party, although Chinese economic development after the reform and opening up of 1978 shows the characteristics of capitalism. Most Chinese companies are owned by the state. Furthermore, even through Chinese Constitution protects the freedom of speech and of the press (see Chapter 2, Article 35), the status of Chinese press is extraordinary and difficult to tackle from a western viewpoint. In China, media plays as the spokesman filtering all negative news and led by the CPC, which means it defends politically governmental issues and positions, even participates in all political propaganda.One hypothesis is that since China is the birthplace of the Confucian culture and since Chinese people see themselves as the continuator of Confucianism, interests' groups PR strategies rely on different action lever than in Western Europe. Common interests are more valued than individual interests, political authority is more important than individual freedoms, also social responsibility wins over individual rights (Chu, 2016, p. 198; Huntington, 1997, p. 10). Functioning as the vanguard of Chinese image's promotion, all people are considered as the spokesman of the CPC, no matter whether they are working for a media company, a cultural public agency or the diplomatic corps. They carry out a gatekeeping process (Brown, 1979, p. 595; Lewin, 1997) to promote CPC ideas and to promote the development in Africa of a kind of socialism that presents Chinese genuine characteristics.The thesis examines the current logic of China's and China's companies' soft power strategies, and the related PR actions. The main research question is: what is so special with the Chinese soft power strategies (one-party system, censorship, propaganda, state monopolies, centralisation of the decision-making process, economic boost, ecological crisis, millennium Confucian philosophy and appealing non-individualistic culture in a context of capitalist crisis)? How are China's governmental diplomacy and corporate PR strategies conceived, deployed and intertwined? How do second-track diplomacy and PR strategies differ and interact? I chose to adopt a comparative approach (two countries and two sectors of activity). How do these strategies interact with other resources of power in the digital and social media age?A multidimensional theoretical framework was mobilized, I aim to associate different approaches of public relations, lobbying, communication, international relations and foreign policy (political science, political theory). Secondly, fieldworks in Kenya and South Africa will take place in Spring 2018 to interview local residents, such as African branches of Chinese enterprises and media (China Telecom, Huawei, StarTimes, CGTN, CCTV, Xinhua), as well as representatives of Confucius Institutes and China's local embassies. I will also analyse the rhetoric and semiotic of Chinese soft power strategies as it reveals itself on sites, forums, blogs and social media platforms, where PR strategies of China's companies and governmental agencies are revealed.In short, I intend to analyse the institutional, rhetorical and technical innovative strategies deployed by China, its second-rack diplomacy, its soft power strategy (local PR actions and digital grass-roots lobbying). My study encompasses the PR actions of Chinese companies and governmental agencies in Africa by focusing on two sectors (telecoms, media), and two main countries: Kenya and South Africa.

International audience ; This thesis focuses on China's hybrid lobbying strategies (economic and cultural, hard and soft power) in the sectors of media and telecommunication in Africa, particularly in Kenya and South Africa. It intends to analyse changing Chinese soft power influence strategies in the digital and social media age. I rely on different perspectives and theoretical approaches: public policies cognitive analysis, media framing effects on political debates, critical analysis of the uses of information and communication tools in different socio- historical backgrounds, prospective analysis of PR techniques evolution (Davidson, 2016; Olsson & Eriksson, 2016; Yeomans, 2016; Kantola, 2016; Bernays, 2013; Berg, 2009). We mean to examine the innovative way in which the Chinese "party-state" spreads a certain vision of its culture and ideology on the African continent in order to promote its economic interest. This grass-roots lobbying (Barnes & Balnave, 2015; Schneider, 2015; Jalali, 2013; Reddick & Norris, 2013) can be described accurately with the metaphor of the Trojan horse.As the essential destination of the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road", the official ways to name Chinese international relations' strategy, Kenya has become a hub for China. China's cultural institutions opened their first African Confucius Institute there. Being one of the members of BRICS, South Africa also grew into the business centre of China in Africa. Many important branches of Chinese Telecom companies are based in the country. It seems that these institutions, no matter public or private, were eventually being an essential channel for China's local PR actions.As the core channels of "soft power", culture and knowledge encapsulate values, ideologies and beliefs (Desmoulins & Huang, 2017; Gupta, 2013; Martel, 2013; DeLisle, 2010; Courmont, 2009; Bläser, 2005; Keohane, Jr, & Keohane, 1998; Nye, 2006, 2004, 1991). China's cultural associations, training institutes, humanitarian foundations, companies as well as government's propaganda are mutually reinforced and seem to be aimed to enhance China's cultural, political and economic influence spheres indifferently.This could not be possible without a high level of centralisation and of governmental control, pervasive media propaganda and well-funded and staffed information censorship institutions. As a matter of fact, China remains a one-party state, its constitution determines the Communist Party of China (CCP) as China's sole ruling party, although Chinese economic development after the reform and opening up of 1978 shows the characteristics of capitalism. Most Chinese companies are owned by the state. Furthermore, even through Chinese Constitution protects the freedom of speech and of the press (see Chapter 2, Article 35), the status of Chinese press is extraordinary and difficult to tackle from a western viewpoint. In China, media plays as the spokesman filtering all negative news and led by the CPC, which means it defends politically governmental issues and positions, even participates in all political propaganda.One hypothesis is that since China is the birthplace of the Confucian culture and since Chinese people see themselves as the continuator of Confucianism, interests' groups PR strategies rely on different action lever than in Western Europe. Common interests are more valued than individual interests, political authority is more important than individual freedoms, also social responsibility wins over individual rights (Chu, 2016, p. 198; Huntington, 1997, p. 10). Functioning as the vanguard of Chinese image's promotion, all people are considered as the spokesman of the CPC, no matter whether they are working for a media company, a cultural public agency or the diplomatic corps. They carry out a gatekeeping process (Brown, 1979, p. 595; Lewin, 1997) to promote CPC ideas and to promote the development in Africa of a kind of socialism that presents Chinese genuine characteristics.The thesis examines the current logic of China's and China's companies' soft power strategies, and the related PR actions. The main research question is: what is so special with the Chinese soft power strategies (one-party system, censorship, propaganda, state monopolies, centralisation of the decision-making process, economic boost, ecological crisis, millennium Confucian philosophy and appealing non-individualistic culture in a context of capitalist crisis)? How are China's governmental diplomacy and corporate PR strategies conceived, deployed and intertwined? How do second-track diplomacy and PR strategies differ and interact? I chose to adopt a comparative approach (two countries and two sectors of activity). How do these strategies interact with other resources of power in the digital and social media age?A multidimensional theoretical framework was mobilized, I aim to associate different approaches of public relations, lobbying, communication, international relations and foreign policy (political science, political theory). Secondly, fieldworks in Kenya and South Africa will take place in Spring 2018 to interview local residents, such as African branches of Chinese enterprises and media (China Telecom, Huawei, StarTimes, CGTN, CCTV, Xinhua), as well as representatives of Confucius Institutes and China's local embassies. I will also analyse the rhetoric and semiotic of Chinese soft power strategies as it reveals itself on sites, forums, blogs and social media platforms, where PR strategies of China's companies and governmental agencies are revealed.In short, I intend to analyse the institutional, rhetorical and technical innovative strategies deployed by China, its second-rack diplomacy, its soft power strategy (local PR actions and digital grass-roots lobbying). My study encompasses the PR actions of Chinese companies and governmental agencies in Africa by focusing on two sectors (telecoms, media), and two main countries: Kenya and South Africa.

International audience ; This thesis focuses on China's hybrid lobbying strategies (economic and cultural, hard and soft power) in the sectors of media and telecommunication in Africa, particularly in Kenya and South Africa. It intends to analyse changing Chinese soft power influence strategies in the digital and social media age. I rely on different perspectives and theoretical approaches: public policies cognitive analysis, media framing effects on political debates, critical analysis of the uses of information and communication tools in different socio- historical backgrounds, prospective analysis of PR techniques evolution (Davidson, 2016; Olsson & Eriksson, 2016; Yeomans, 2016; Kantola, 2016; Bernays, 2013; Berg, 2009). We mean to examine the innovative way in which the Chinese "party-state" spreads a certain vision of its culture and ideology on the African continent in order to promote its economic interest. This grass-roots lobbying (Barnes & Balnave, 2015; Schneider, 2015; Jalali, 2013; Reddick & Norris, 2013) can be described accurately with the metaphor of the Trojan horse.As the essential destination of the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road", the official ways to name Chinese international relations' strategy, Kenya has become a hub for China. China's cultural institutions opened their first African Confucius Institute there. Being one of the members of BRICS, South Africa also grew into the business centre of China in Africa. Many important branches of Chinese Telecom companies are based in the country. It seems that these institutions, no matter public or private, were eventually being an essential channel for China's local PR actions.As the core channels of "soft power", culture and knowledge encapsulate values, ideologies and beliefs (Desmoulins & Huang, 2017; Gupta, 2013; Martel, 2013; DeLisle, 2010; Courmont, 2009; Bläser, 2005; Keohane, Jr, & Keohane, 1998; Nye, 2006, 2004, 1991). China's cultural associations, training institutes, humanitarian foundations, companies as well ...